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Abstract Associative representational plasticity (ARP) con-
cerns the systematic modification of neuronal responses to a
stimulus dimension that involves the learning of relation-
ships between a conditioned stimulus (CS) on that dimension
with a behaviorally significant reinforcer. Most extensively
studied for acoustic frequency in the primary auditory cortex
(A1), the dominant findings are a CS-specific increase in
response and a CS-directed shift of tuning. Extensive
characterization of this ARP suggests that it serves as part
of the substrate of specific memory. Ohl and Scheich have
argued that neither the form nor suggested function is valid.
They claim that the form of ARP is a CS-specific decreased
response, and the function is lateral contrast enhancement.
An analysis of their arguments reveals that their claims rest
on problematic assumptions, confusions, and failure to
obtain behavioral validation of associative learning. While
new forms and possible functions of ARPs may be
discovered, they have not yet been substantiated.
Keywords association . conditioning . receptive field .
plasticity . learning . memory
Introduction
This debate with Frank Ohl and Henning Scheich (O&S) is
about associative learning and neurophysiological plasticity
in the primary auditory cortex (A1). The traditional view
that A1 (and other primary sensory cortices) are only
stimulus analyzers has not been tenable for some time. A
major focus of current research is to understand the nature
of learning-related plasticity in the primary auditory cortex,
including its (a) forms and (b) functions. O&S have
criticized us on both issues, which are addressed in turn.
Some disputes concern appropriate experimental designs,
while others deal with more general problems. However, all
of the issues have broad implications, so this debate can
best serve as a vehicle for consideration of several key
topics in the neuroscience of learning/memory and sensory/
perceptual processes [1, 2]. An important aspect of this
debate is to delineate and examine assumptions because
many controversies ultimately reflect different assumptions
that are embedded within implicit theoretical frameworks.
Theoretical framework and assumptions
Before examining the specific issues, it is appropriate that we
make explicit our theoretical framework. While it does not
bear directly on the interpretation of every experimental
finding, it does differ from that of O&S. For example, they
view memory as tightly linked to behavioral indices of
learning. Thus, they assume that memory traces develop only
in areas whose destruction produces behavioral deficits (see
also Point #6C). We have a different position (see below).
We have made extensive use of “simple” one-tone
classical conditioning because it is the most fundamental
form of associative learning, and thus, we assume that it is
an appropriate starting place. We assume that the total
memory of a given experience is multidimensional and
therefore is distributed in the brain. We also presume that
any cortical neuron participates in numerous memories as a
component of innumerable complex networks. As memo-
ries have specific and detailed sensory content, we suppose
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that auditory memories are likely to be stored, at least in
part, within recognized structures of the auditory system.
We further assume that circuitry which is sufficient for
some aspects of a “simple” association can be completely
subcortical, so that it can survive cortical lesions. However,
we also believe that cortical areas can store information in
parallel with subcortical systems. In addition, we presume
that cortical memory traces are more complex than
subcortical traces. The former have access to a much
greater range of information than the latter, so cortical
traces could be used in a highly flexible manner to support
adaptive behaviors in an unknown future. We think it likely
that neural mechanisms of all learning-related A1 plasticity
involve both stimulus-driven (“bottom-up”) and goal-
driven (“top-down”) influences. Thus, the particular form
of plasticity that is expressed by neurons after learning
depends both on current stimulus parameters and the
situation in which the subjects are being “interrogated” by
experimenters. Therefore, A1 (or any other cortical field) is
not “fixed” in a given expression of plasticity and is thus
not severely limited in its capacity to store different
memory traces. Finally, we believe that A1 works with
other auditory circuitry to extract behaviorally meaningful
information from the acoustic environment and use that
information to meet whatever may be the current behavioral
opportunities and challenges. However, virtually nothing is
presently known about learning-related integration among
cortical auditory fields.
Associative learning and perceptual learning
are different
Associative learning (sometimes called “content learning”
[3]) and perceptual learning are related but different.
“Associative learning” simply refers to the acquisition of
information that two events occur nonrandomly, usually
with one preceding the other. Classical conditioning is the
most basic form of associative learning, in which a
conditioned stimulus (CS, e.g., tone) is followed by an
unconditioned stimulus (US, e.g., shock or food). The
subjects learn and remember that the CS predicts the US.
“Instrumental conditioning”, which is based on prior
classical conditioning, consists of learning to perform a
particular behavioral response (e.g., key press) when
presented with a CS, to obtain a reward or avoid a noxious
stimulus. The subjects learn and remember that the specific
instrumental response in the presence of a particular CS
will produce a certain reinforcement (e.g., food). Associa-
tive learning always has “content”, i.e., associations are
about the relationships between some particular experi-
ences. Such associations enable animals and humans to learn
the “causal fabric” of their environments [4].
“Perceptual learning” consists of first learning to discrim-
inate between two different signal stimuli (e.g., tones), one of
which is designated as “correct” by the experimenter. After an
easy discrimination has been achieved, increasingly difficult
discrimination problems are used, until there is no further
improvement. Training usually involves hundreds to
thousands of trials over many days. The result of perceptual
learning is to improve perceptual abilities on the training
dimension, such as improving acuity for frequency discrim-
ination. However, unlike basic associative learning, percep-
tual learning is not presumed to include “perceptual memory”,
i.e., to yield specific memories for each of the many paired
frequencies used throughout the extensive period of training
[5]. Regardless of the duration of training, subjects ordinarily
first learn basic associations, i.e., classical conditioning, and
then learn to make a response contingent on an acoustic
stimulus and a reinforcer, i.e., simple instrumental conditioning
(Fig. 1).
There are two reasons within the current debate to
emphasize the differences between associative learning and
perceptual learning. First, associative learning usually
precedes perceptual learning. For example, subjects gener-
ally first learn that a sound is followed by food before they
learn which particular sound frequency (CS+, reinforced;
CS−, non-reinforced) is followed by food. Thus, when
neural correlates of perceptual learning are obtained, the
brain (in the present case, the primary auditory cortex) may
have previously developed associative plasticity. Such
associative plasticity could be the foundation upon which
plasticity for perceptual learning develops. Second, some
workers treat all auditory learning as “perceptual learning”
because it occurs in a “perceptual system”. Ohl and Scheich
appear not to distinguish between associative learning and
perceptual learning. Therefore, they seem to assume that
mechanisms proposed for associative learning are intended
to account for perceptual learning as well [6]. Their critique
of our findings on such a basis is not further considered in
this debate, as there is no need for us to defend a position
that we have not held. Our research has concerned
associative plasticity, and it is therefore to this topic that
we now turn.
Background
Learning-induced plasticity in the primary auditory cortex
was discovered by Galambos et al. [7]; classical conditioning
increased the amplitude of evoked potentials in A1 as cats
learned a sound–airpuff association. Subsequently, other
laboratories extended investigations to various learning
situations and increasingly replaced evoked potential record-
ings with multiple-unit activity. The findings were the same,
viz., that sounds which gained behavioral importance also
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evoked greater activity. The next development involved
single unit recording. This research revealed a more
complicated situation: a certain proportion of A1 cells
increased their discharges (as expected), but invariably,
another proportion decreased their discharges. While these
effects were shown to be associative, they made little
functional sense (reviewed in Weinberger and Diamond [8]).
Our own studies of classical fear conditioning (sound-
shock pairing) in both A1 and the little understood adjacent
“secondary field” (A2) yielded similar mixed effects [9,
10]. For example, we found that during training trials, an
equal number of single units in A1 developed increased or
decreased responses to the acoustic CS. Such findings
convinced us that simply recording cellular activity during
training trials yielded data that were both difficult to
interpret and too limiting.
The interpretive difficulties stem from the fact that
although associations are formed during training trials,
non-learning factors are invariably present, due at least to
the presence of positive (reward) or negative (punishment)
reinforcements. Such factors include changes in attention,
arousal level, motor planning, and motor performance. For
example, as subjects learn that they face a problem posed
by experiments, their arousal level is likely to increase. It
may well continue to remain high or even further increase
during early stages of the training experience before they
are able to solve the challenge posed. But as they achieve a
solution, e.g., learn the predictive relationships between a
CS and US, their excitability generally declines. Indeed, in
some cases, subjects will sleep between trials as when dogs
had solved a shuttlebox avoidance problem and leisurely
awoke to the CS presentation and performed the required
response in plenty of time to avoid shock [11].
Because of such performance factors, Rescorla has
emphasized the dangers of relying on data obtained during
training trials to infer the strength of learning and those
Fig. 1 Comparison of typical protocols for associative learning and
perceptual learning. Whereas associative learning produces specific
memories, perceptual learning produces an increase in acuity for the
trained dimension without necessarily specific memories of each of
the discriminative stimulus values. The error signal (feedback) for
responses to a CS is illustrated for completeness but is not invariably
used in studies of perceptual learning.
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aspects of an experience that enter into memory. Rather,
these attributes are best determined by appropriate post-
training assessments of behavior [4]. This counsel is
equally applicable to plasticity that develops during training
trials. Thus, even when the development of plasticity during
training trials can be attributed to associative factors (e.g.,
by use of a sensitization control group), the form and
magnitude of this neural correlate do not necessarily reflect
only associative processes, but rather, are likely to be a
mixture of associative and non-associative factors. That is
why plasticity obtained during training trials can be so
different in sign (increase vs decrease) from plasticity
obtained in post-training assessments outside of the training
context [12, 13].
Although not universally recognized, there is a substan-
tial difference between demonstrating that a neural correlate
of learning is associative and determining the nature and
degree of the specificity of plasticity. The former is a first
step. The latter provides information on how the represen-
tation of information is altered by associative learning.
Primary sensory cortices are advantageous regions of the
brain in which to address this issue of specific representa-
tional plasticity because their cells have reliable receptive
fields and the primary auditory, somatosensory, and visual
cortices contain well-characterized, systematic topographi-
cal “maps” of their individual sensory epithelia.
This consideration brings us to the second limitation of
information that can be gleaned from limiting recording to
training trials. The specificity of plasticity cannot be
ascertained because training involves only one or two
sensory stimuli. For example, in “simple” acoustic condi-
tioning, there is a single auditory CS paired with a US. In
discrimination learning, two sounds are employed, one of
which (the CS+) is paired with the US, the other (the CS−)
is not. While successful discrimination training demon-
strates that subjects have learned to distinguish the stimuli
in question, two stimuli are insufficient to determine the
actual degree of specificity of any resultant neural plasticity.
A unified experimental design: a synthesis
of two disciplines
The problems of confounding performance factors and
inability to more precisely determine the specificity of
plasticity requires an experimental design different from
standard training trials. A key goal of a new approach was
to determine the effects of learning on the frequency
receptive fields (RF) of cells in the auditory system,
particularly in the primary auditory cortex. The basic
design is simple: (1) obtain tuning curves; (2) train subjects
using any frequency except the best frequency (peak of
tuning curve) as a signal for reward or punishment [e.g.,
conditioned stimulus (CS) in classical conditioning]; (3)
obtain post-training tuning curves. Additional post-training
RFs can be obtained later to determine the long-term
retentions of any induced plasticity. (For sake of exposition,
findings from classical conditioning will be used, but the
approach and findings also apply to other types of training.)
Fig. 2 summarizes both this and related designs.
There are two additional requirements. First, pre- and
post-training data must be obtained in the same context, so
that any differences between the RFs can be attributed to
the intervening training and learning rather than to any
collateral factor, such as the effects of novelty in a new
post-training environment.
Second, training must take place in a different context
from that in which pre- and post-training RFs are obtained.
This reduces or eliminates the possibility of experimental
extinction during the post-training period, when the training
reinforcer (e.g., food or shock) must be absent. It also
prevents transfer of any contextual learning from the
training situation to the post-training environment, which
would affect a subject’s state of arousal, fear or expectation;
these would render the post-training state of the subject
different from the pre-training state.
Of course, there must be behavioral verification that
learning has occurred, and this can be obtained during
training. The absence of behavioral conditioning in a
control group that receives the conditioned and uncondi-
tioned stimuli (in an unpaired or random manner) indicates
that effects obtained from a CS–US pairing protocol are due
to associative processes.
Evidence of the lack of transfer from the training period
to the post-training period can be obtained by showing that
while subjects give learned behavioral responses to the
signal frequency during training, the same frequency
presented post-training elicits no such behavior. An
effective method to avoid transfer is to also change the
acoustic context. For example, when training consists of a
20-s tone of a single frequency followed by reinforcement,
with intervals between trials averaging many (e.g., 60)
seconds, RFs are obtained by presenting many brief (e.g.,
100 ms) frequencies at a high rate (e.g., 2/s). When so
tested, subjects do not respond to the CS frequency during
RF determination [12].
The first study to use the unified design with contextual
control investigated classical conditioning in the cat and
studied the secondary (A2) and ventral ectosylvian (VE)
auditory cortical fields [13]. Post-conditioning frequency
RFs revealed CS-specific associative plasticity that could
be either an increase or a decrease in response. Of particular
note, the sign of plasticity that was observed during training
trials usually differed from that which was evident in post-
training tuning curves, e.g., increased response to the CS
during conditioning vs decreased CS-frequency specific
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response in receptive fields. Therefore, the precautions of
the unified design were well advised, as plasticity observed
during actual training trials does not predict the form
(direction of CS-specific change) in receptive fields. All
subsequent studies in our and other laboratories have
investigated the primary auditory cortex.
The dominant finding in our laboratory has been a CS-
specific increase in response magnitude (rate of discharge
Fig. 2 Schematic summary of experimental designs employed in the
neurophysiological study of learning and the auditory cortex. Depicted
are four basic designs [1–4] and their treatments during three
experimental periods: “Pre” (before training), “During” (during
training) and “Post” (after training). 1 Standard training, in which
recordings are obtained only during training trials, e.g., [10]. 2 Unified
design (see text). Pre–Post designs 2a and 2b illustrate the fact that
any training paradigm can be used. 2a shows single tone conditioning
(e.g., [22]), and 2b illustrates two-tone discrimination conditioning (e.g.,
[20]). 3 Modifications of the unified design for cases in which pre-
training data cannot be obtained, e.g., complete mapping of the cortex.
Designs 3a and 3b also illustrate the fact that any training paradigms
can be used with a post-design. 3a illustrates the case of single tone
conditioning, whereas 3b shows an example of two-tone instrumental
training, in which reward is contingent upon the correct response, i.e.,
one response if the two tones (S1 and S2) are the same and another
response if they are different (responses not shown). In 3a, the “x” in
the post-period signifies sacrifice of the animal for 2-DG analysis after
repeated presentation of a conditioned stimulus (e.g., [45]). In design 4,
the “CS/US” denotes that one of the frequencies in a series of tone
bursts is designated as the conditioned stimulus and is paired with
shock; the serial order of tones is random from one sequence to another
(e.g., [14]). The repeated vertical lines represent presentation of tone
bursts. The dotted lines in the post-period for designs 2 and 4 indicate
that additional post-periods can be used to determine long term
retention, etc. Illustrations are not to scale.
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or amplitude of evoked potentials). Examples of receptive
fields and CS-specific RF plasticity are given in Figs. 3 and 4.
A summary of the effects of conditioning (CS–US pairing),
sensitization and habituation (tone presented repeatedly
alone) are given in Fig. 5.
We can now turn to the issues in dispute.
Form of associative representational plasticity
1. Rejection of our findings
This issue, according to O&S, is whether associative
representation plasticity (hereafter “ARP”) involves specific
increases in responses to the CS or decreases in response to
the CS. They reject the CS-specific increases we observed,
claiming that they were tainted by contextual factors.
“...learning-induced changes in the CS+ representation
have been shown to be critically dependent on
delicate contextual circumstances in other experiments
(Weinberger and Diamond, 1986; Diamond and
Weinberger, 1989...). Hence, we took care to develop
an experimental protocol which minimizes contextual
influences that are not under experimental control.”
[14] [page 1012].
Rebuttal to 1. The basis for this critique could reflect two
conjoint assumptions by O&S: (a) that the form of plasticity
during training trials reflects only associative factors; (b)
that the sign of plasticity must be the same during and after
training trials.
We deliberately imposed strikingly different acoustic
contexts for the periods of receptive field determination vs
training (conditioning) periods, to avoid experimental
extinction and contextual transfer, as explained above. This
feature is the essence of the new unified design. The phrase
of O&S “...delicate contextual circumstances...” is mislead-
ing; there was nothing “delicate” about them. As explained
above, the unified experimental design benefits from using
markedly different acoustic contexts between training and
RF determination (Table 1). Moreover, these contextual
influences were most definitely under our control.
2. Claim That We “Selected” Findings of CS Increases
and Ignored CS Decreases
O&S criticize us for focusing on CS-specific increased
responses, and presumably, the accompanying tuning shifts
Fig. 3 Classical conditioning produces tuning shifts. An example of a
complete shift of frequency tuning of a single cell in A1 of the guinea
pig from a pre-training best frequency (BF) of 0.75 kHz to the CS
frequency of 2.5 kHz after 30 trials of tone-shock pairing, during
which the guinea pig developed a cardiac conditioned response. Inset
shows pre- and post-training poststimulus time histograms (PSTHs)
for the pre-training BF and the CS frequencies.
Fig. 4 Associative processes favor responses to the frequency of the
CS in a variety of circumstances. Single unit recordings from A1 of
the guinea pig. a Double-peaked tuning, with pre-training BFs at 5.0
and 8.0 kHz. The CS was selected to be 6.0 kHz, a low point. After
conditioning (30 trials), responses to the CS frequency increased to
become the peak of tuning. b A cell that exhibited minimal or no
response to tones before tuning developed tuning specifically to the
CS frequency after conditioning (30 trials).
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to and toward the CS frequency. They assert that we have
selectively ignored CS-specific decreased responses [6, 14].
“In the case of auditory single-unit plasticity studied
with extracellular recording, a phenomenon that has
gained wide attention is the learning-induced increase
in the CS+ evoked spike rate. Most of the currently
held views of auditory cortical plasticity are based
upon this phenomenon (Weinberger, 1990a, b). This
selective view [ital. added] tends to neglect two pieces
of experimental evidence which are either explicitly
mentioned in some of these studies or, in other cases,
can be taken from the published figures. The first is
the existence of sometimes large changes in tone-
evoked activity in response to frequencies other than
the CS (Diamond and Weinberger, 1986, 1989); the
other is the existence of reduced CS responses after
training [9, 10].” [14], [page 1014].
This critique needs to be separated into three parts. The
first concerns changes in response to frequencies other than
the CS. The second is about decreased responses to the CS
during training trials. Closely related is the third: CS-
specific decreased responses in frequency receptive fields
after training.
2A. Response changes to non-CS frequencies
O&S criticize us for allegedly failing to account for
“...sometimes large changes in tone-evoked activity in
response to frequencies other than the CS in post-training
RFs [12, 13].”
Rebuttal to 2A. O&S are referring to our first RF study,
which did not concern primary auditory cortex, but rather,
secondary (A2) and ventral ectosylvian (VE) fields. As our
model [2, 15] and all other studies concern primary
auditory cortex, this critique reflects the failure of O&S to
distinguish between A1 and fields that differ from it greatly
in functional organization (see also rebuttal to 2C, below).
Furthermore, their point is irrelevant, whether for A1 or any
other part of the auditory system, because we have not held
that large changes must be confined to the CS frequency;
(see also rebuttal to 3).
2B. Decreased responses to the CS during training trials
O&S are referring to decreased responses to the CS in
single unit studies of plasticity during training trials in A1
and also secondary auditory cortex (A2), before we had
started to use the unified design to study RF plasticity [9,
10].
Rebuttal to 2B. Of course, we observed decreased
responses to the CS and increased responses to the CS
during training trials. As explained above, the mixed sign
of response changes to the CS was a major motivation to
undertake RF studies, given the realization that data
obtained during training do not reflect associative processes
alone and cannot reveal the degree of specificity of
plasticity. The unified design avoids basing conclusions
on response changes during training trials, but rather
Fig. 5 Summary of the effects of a conditioning, b sensitization, and
c habituation on frequency receptive fields in the primary auditory
cortex of the guinea pig. Data are normalized to octave distance from
the CS frequency (a), the pre-sensitization best frequency (b), or the
repeated frequency (c). Note that conditioning produces a CS-specific
increased response, whereas sensitization (tone-shock or light-shock
unpaired) produces general increases across the spectrum. Habituation
produces frequency-specific decreased response.
Table 1 Designated contextual differences between training and RF
determination
Parameter Training trials RF determination
Number of frequencies 1 20–30
Frequency range NA 0.7–24.0 kHz
Duration of tone 300 ms 300 ms
Tone level 70–80 30–85 dB
Tone level fixed or varied? Fixed Varied
Interval between trials/tones 40 s 1.5 s
Fixed or random intervals? Random Fixed
Tone sequence repetitions NA 10–15
Mild shock stimulus Yes No
Note that acoustic contexts between training trials and determination
of frequency receptive fields (both pre- and post-training) are
markedly different; only the duration of the tone is the same.
Furthermore, the unconditioned stimulus (mild shock stimulation) is
present only during training trials. During post-training RF determi-
nation, subjects do not respond to the CS tone when it is embedded in
the different context [12, 13].
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compares receptive fields before and after training when the
subjects are in the same state and in an acoustic context
different from that of training.
In short, the fact of decreased (and increased) responses
to the CS during training trials is irrelevant to the issue of
the sign of CS-specific plasticity in post-training receptive
fields. This critique seems to be based on the assumption of
O&S that periods of training trials and RF determination
are functionally the same. If so, their critique illustrates a
failure to adequately appreciate the distinction, e.g., that
state and other performance factors are endemic to training
trials. The critique also seems to embody the assumption
that the sign of plasticity must be the same during training
and post-training RF determination. These assumptions
would explain why O&S consider decreased responses to
the CS during training trials to be contradictory to the
dominant findings of CS-specific increased responses to the
CS in post-training receptive fields.
2C. Receptive field plasticity after training trials
In point 2B, O&S may have intended to refer to CS-
specific decreased responses in our first studies of RF
plasticity [12, 13]. These particular findings appear directly
contradictory to our observations of only CS-specific
increased responses in A1.
Rebuttal to 2C. However, these recordings were not
obtained from the primary auditory cortex; they were
obtained from the secondary auditory (A2) and the ventral
ectosylvian (VE) fields. The mixed outcome of RF
plasticity (CS-specific increased and decreased responses)
in A2 and VE remain valid observations. Unfortunately, no
other laboratories have studied RF plasticity in these
auditory fields, and we, like other laboratories, have since
concentrated on A1 because more is known about its basic
processing of sound and its functional organization than
any other auditory field. We have focused on CS-specific
increased responses (and tuning shifts) in A1 simply
because this is the predominant finding in the primary
auditory cortex (e.g., [16–27]. Concordant with the findings
of increased response to behaviorally important stimuli, it is
noteworthy that studies of parameters other than frequency
also have reported specificity of increased responses, e.g.,
sound intensity (level) [28] and the repetition rate of sound
pulses [29]. Table 2 summarizes findings from our
laboratory.
3. Claim that our measures are biased to detect only CS-
specific increased responses
O&S argue that our analyses of the effects of learning on
receptive fields are biased to permit detection only of CS-
specific increased responses.
“The criterion for frequency-specific plasticity used by
Weinberger, namely the requirement that learning-
induced changes of firing probability at the training
frequency must exceed all other changes [ital. added],
leads a strong bias towards the particular type of
retuning described in the article.” [30].
Rebuttal to 3. O&S are wrong because they are confused.
In the paper to which they refer, a set of conservative criteria
for CS-specific RF plasticity was used, to avoid false
positive findings. One criterion was “...the largest change
in the RF difference function [i.e., post minus pre-training
RFs] had to be at the CS frequency ...” [22, page 275].
The previous paragraph of this paper provides the
formula which was based on the absolute difference, not a
positive difference. Thus, the “largest change” could have
been either a CS-specific increase or a CS-specific
decrease. But CS-specific decreases were seldom observed
in A1. However, the same analysis revealed some CS-
specific decreases in the dorsal medial geniculate nucleus
[31] and in A1 during avoidance conditioning [18]; see also
Table 2. Therefore, our measures are sensitive to decreases
and increases, and the claim of O&S can be rejected.
4. O&S claim of CS-specific decreased responses in post-
training receptive fields
O&S performed an experiment in which they found CS-
specific decreased responses after training. A single CS+
tone (paired with shock) was randomly intermixed with 11–
30 different CS- (no shock) frequencies in a single training
session. The same frequencies were presented before,
during, and after training without break, so that the only
information that training was underway was the presence of
an occasional shock [14, 32] (Figure 2.4).
Table 2 Summary of the di-
rection of CS-specific plasticity
in studies of primary auditory
cortex and medial geniculate
nucleus from Weinberger lab









[22] A1 7 100 0
[20] A1 20 100 0
[21] A1 9 100 0
[18] A1 15 87 13
[47] MGv 5 100 0
[31] MGd 21 76 24
[46] MGm 14 100 0
92 Debates in Neuroscience (2007) 1:85–98
Two assumptions seem to underlie the claimed validity
of learning-induced CS-specific decreased responses in
RFs. First, O&S assumed that their subjects learned this
unique, difficult discrimination. However, there are no
reports in the literature that a discrimination between one
CS+ frequency and 11–30 other CS- frequencies can be
learned, particularly in a single session. Second, O&S
assumed that differences between RFs from pre- and post-
training periods are attributable only to CS–US learning
during training. Both assumptions are untenable.
4A. Claim that subjects had learned the discrimination
O&S provided no behavioral evidence that the subjects
learned the difficult discrimination. Although the authors
recorded heart rate, they chose to use extremely brief
intertone/intertrial intervals of 0.25–3.0 s, thus, precluding
an opportunity to obtain behavioral evidence of discrimi-
nation. Had they employed accepted discrimination inter-
trial intervals (e.g., a minimum of ∼20 s), O&S might have
obtained discriminative cardiac conditioned responses [20],
which would have substantiated their claim of successful
discrimination learning.
In the absence of behavioral validation of discrimination
learning, the authors resorted to indirect arguments to
support their claims. Referring to their current results, the
authors stated:
“A similar rapidity in the development of plastic effects
has been reported by Edeline et al. (1993). Long-term
retention of receptive field plasticity was also recently
reported by Weinberger et al. (1993). These results
provide strong support for the argument that the type of
plasticity we describe is indeed a correlate of learning.
This is important to note since the nature of the study
did not technically allow us to measure a stringent
behavioural correlate of learning.” [page 1013].
Rebuttal to 4A. The use of our findings to support their
claim of behavioral learning is ironic, but more importantly,
it is illogical. First, attributes of plasticity cannot validate
behavioral learning. This constitutes a “category error”, i.e.,
confusing properties of the whole (the organism) with
properties of a part (its cells) [33]. Second, the characteristic
of rapid development of plasticity is not unique to learning.
Even within the field of learning/memory, rapid changes are
not unique to successful acquisition in conditioning. For
example, they are equally typical of extinction. Of secondary
interest, the studies O&S use to support their claims showed
rapid development of plasticity in five trials [21] and long-
term retention of 24 h to 8 weeks [19], neither of which
values were attained in the O&S study.
4B. Claim that CS-specific decreased responses are
associative
O&S argue that the decreased response to the CS
frequency was due only to associative processes that were
operative during the training phase. They arrived at this
conclusion by subtracting post-training RFs from pre-
training RFs. This subtraction indeed did show decreased
responses. However, the authors also realized that the post-
training period constituted a formal period of experimental
extinction, i.e., due to the removal of the shock uncondi-
tioned stimulus (Figure 2.4). Therefore, they attempted to
avoid the effects of extinction by limiting statistical
analyses to the first ten repetitions of the 11–30 different
tone sequences used to obtain receptive fields.
Rebuttal to 4B. The attempt to avoid the effects of ex-
tinction is problematic because extinction can develop within
ten repetitions of a CS, if the subjects had learned the
discrimination. In fact, the specificity of the decreased response
to the CS frequency is consistent with this possibility. But as
noted above, there is no way to resolve this issue on the basis of
the experiments performed by the authors.
Moreover, regardless of whether or not extinction had
occurred, the subjects’ post-training state must have been
different from pre-training because arousal and fear would
have been higher due to the anticipation of shock after
training. Therefore, the difference in neural response
between the post-training and pre-training RF periods could
be due to learning that had occurred during training, or to
the change of state, or to both (Table 3). Thus, it is impos-
sible to assign any RF changes exclusively to putative
discrimination learning during the training period. This is
precisely why the unified experimental design was formu-
lated; it avoids such confounds by keeping the pre and post-
training periods identical, while changing the context
during training (Figure 2.2a,b).
Functions of associative plasticity in primary auditory
cortex
5. Memory traces, lateral contrast enhancement, and task
dependency
We suggest that CS-specific associative plasticity in A1
represents the storage of acquired information, i.e., is part
of the substrate of auditory associative memory. O&S
believe that a selective decrease in response to the CS
frequency with enhancement of side-band frequencies
serves as “lateral contrast enhancement” [14]. They also
argue that plasticity is “task dependent”, which O&S say is
incompatible with learning/memory functions. Referring to
our findings (later replicated independently by Suga and
associates (e.g., [24–27] and Gerstein’s laboratory [23],
O&S state the following:
“The general finding in these experiments was that
training shifted the best frequency (BF) of neurons towards
the reinforced frequency ... The main argument is that this
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type of retuning constitutes memory storage in the service
of different future adaptive behaviors, that is, it is not task-
specific” [italics added]. [6] [pages 470–471].
Rebuttal to 5. The veracity of CS-specific decreased
responses in RFs during associative learning has already
been examined and found to be wanting (see 4). It follows
that “lateral contrast enhancement”, which is based on such
findings, lacks sufficient empirical basis in associative
learning. It might develop in perceptual learning (see below).
According to O&S, plasticity is task-specific, which is
incompatible with A1 plasticity as memory storage.
Although O&S have not yet explicated the rationale for
this alleged incompatibility, it would follow logically that if
plasticity does reflect memory storage, then it cannot be
task-specific. The evidence that CS-specific associative
plasticity represents part of the substrate of auditory
memory is quite strong. Thus, such plasticity has all of
the major attributes of associative memory: it is associative,
highly-specific, discriminative, develops rapidly, exhibits
consolidation (becomes stronger and more specific over
days in the absence of further training), and exhibits long-
term retention (weeks) (reviewed in [34, 35]. In addition,
the amount of expanded representation of the CS frequency
band in A1 is an increasing function of the level of
behavioral importance of that stimulus, indicating that area
of representation could serve as a “memory code” for the
acquired behavioral significance of sound [16].
We do not hold that task-specificity is incompatible with
memory storage. Quite the contrary. Acoustic habituation is
characterized by a specific decrease in response to the
repeated tone [36] (Fig. 5C). Behavioral habituation
certainly depends upon memory storage, and the sign of
plasticity is a decrease rather than an increase. Therefore,
the signs of plasticity are different in different tasks,
indicating that task-specificity and memory storage are not
incompatible.
6. O&S fallacious assertion of our stance on plasticity and
auditory memory
O&S accuse us of claiming that A1 plasticity is essential
for all auditory learning and memory [30].
The review by Weinberger is of merit in pointing to
the often neglected fact that learning-induced plasticity
is found as early as primary sensory cortical areas. A
main focus of the article is the attempt to establish a
mechanistic relationship between suitably designed
behavioural paradigms and plastic phenomena on the
neuronal level of the primary auditory cortex. However,
it should be pointed out that the article went too far in
claiming the dependence of auditory memory on the
type of neuronal plasticity that is described. [ital.
added] Best frequency shifts as a form of retuning of
neurons’ receptive fields, and the reorganization of the
tonotopic map measured by best frequencies are
neither sufficient nor necessary for the described types
of auditory learning and memory. They are not
sufficient because map reorganization induced by
alternative means (electrical microstimulation) does
not alter frequency discrimination performance, and
they are not necessary because tonal memory can
develop even after bilateral ablation of the auditory
cortex ... On the other hand, in training paradigms in
which the relevance of the auditory cortex has been
positively shown [37] many mechanisms are required
which cannot be accounted for by simple retuning of a
unit’s best frequency.”
This O&S critique involves three issues: (a) our position
on the necessity of A1 plasticity, (b) more general issues
Table 3 Comparison of the factors of State and Learning in the experimental design of Ohl and Scheich [14, 32] and the “unified design” [e.g.,
19] during the three experimental periods: pre-training, during training, and post-training
Factor Pre-training Training Post-training Post minus pre-training
Ohl and Scheich (1996, 1997) [14, 32]
State 0 + + +−0=+
Learning 0 + + +−0=+
Unified design [e.g., 22]
State 0 + 0 0−0=0
Learning 0 + + +−0=+
The last column denotes the assessment of the effects of training by subtracting receptive fields in the Pre-period from receptive fields obtained in
the Post-period. “0” denotes whatever ground state or status of learning is present during a period. “+” indicates a change from the ground states.
Both designs begin with baselines of no learning and similar quiet levels of arousal state. During training, both designs entail changes for both
state and the establishment of learned associations. The designs differ in that the Ohl-Scheich design engenders the same state change in the Post-
period as during training, whereas the unified design maintains state during the Post-period and the Pre-period. The continuation of the state
changes (e.g., increased arousal) in the Ohl-Scheich design is caused by maintaining an identical acoustic context so that subjects continue to
expect shock and are subject to experimental extinction, during Post-training. Therefore, subtracting the Pre- from the Post-data confounds state
and associative processes. In contrast, the unified design avoids this confound by keeping context the same in the Pre- and Post-training periods
but insuring that during training, the context is different from both of these [e.g., 22]. Thus, subtracting the Pre- from the Post-data provides
estimates of the effects of learning per se, independent of state effects.
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concerning sufficiency and necessity, and (c) the role of A1
lesions and pure tones for claims of memory-relatedness.
6A. Our stance on cortical plasticity
O&S, referring to a recent review [1] assert that we claim
A1 plasticity is essential for auditory memory: “...went too
far in claiming the dependence of auditory memory on the
type of neuronal plasticity that is described.”
Rebuttal to 6A. We have never made any claim that
auditory memory depends on receptive field (or other)
plasticity in A1, either in the review cited by O&S or in any
other venue. Therefore, it is incumbent upon O&S either to
substantiate or retract their assertion.
6B. Necessity and sufficiency
O&S hold that A1 plasticity is neither necessary nor
sufficient for all auditory memory.
Rebuttal to 6B. We have never claimed that A1 plasticity
is either sufficient or necessary for all auditory memory.
Indeed, we first showed an instance in which CS-specific A1
plasticity was not sufficient, by increasing task difficulty in
two-tone discrimination, such that while plasticity did
develop, behavioral discrimination did not [20].
However, O&S draw conclusions that are too sweeping.
They cite the failure of cortical microstimulation to alter
frequency discrimination performance [38] to conclude that
cortical plasticity can never be sufficient for behavioral
memory. This way of thinking is problematic for two
reasons. First, the effects of microstimulation on cortical
organization are highly transient so that cortical plasticity
may well have dissipated before the poststimulation
behavioral test (G. Gerstein, personal communication).
Second, O&S dismiss tuning shifts and map expansions
as ever being sufficient for behavioral memory based on
one example of dissociation between plasticity and a single
measure of auditory performance. But such a dissociation
can only show that cortical plasticity is not sufficient for
some aspect of auditory memory as measured in a certain
way. In short, the argument from an example to the whole
constitutes an invalid inductive leap.
More importantly, O&S cast the issue of the relationship
between cortical plasticity and learning/memory in too
simple a dichotomy: either plasticity is sufficient or
necessary, or not. But Nature is not often so dichotomous.
A1 plasticity might be sufficient or necessary or both for
some types of learning and memory but not others. The
fundamental issue concerns the relationships between
plasticities and memories, i.e., discovery of the principles
governing the circumstances under which cortical plasticity
of a certain type develops, its relations to types of
information stored, and ultimately how they are integrated
to guide and underlie thought and behavior. The positive
relationship between level of motivation and area of
representation is one demonstration that “yes or no”
approaches fail to capture essential aspects of A1 plasticity.
6C. A1 lesions, pure tones and memory traces
O&S strongly imply that lesions of A1 are critical for
determining which tasks produce plasticities that are part of
the substrate for auditory memory. They refer to a study in
which A1 lesions impair discrimination of frequency-
modulated (FM), but not pure tone, stimuli [37]; “... in
training paradigms in which the relevance of the auditory
cortex has been positively shown ...”. Given the context of
their critique, the implication is a relative disregard for CS-
specific increases and tuning shifts during tasks employing
pure tones.
Rebuttal to 6C. It is, of course, well-established that
lesions of A1 can fail to reveal auditory-based deficits for
pure tone tasks, as emphasized by O&S. However, that
depends on the methods of training (for an important early
review, see [39]) and the “questions” posed to the animal
subjects. For example, two-tone discrimination training can
reveal lesion-based deficits in acquisition and retention [40,
41], and A1 lesions impair extinction after removal of the
US [42].
O&S appear to assume that memory traces can develop
only in structures in which destruction produces behavioral
impairments. In contrast, contemporary conceptions of
memory substrates acknowledge distributed storage. For
tonal conditioning, specific receptive-field shifts develop
not only in A1 but also in all three nuclei of the medial
geniculate body, and associative plasticity (not yet checked
for specificity) develops in lower auditory structures and at
least the amygdala and the hippocampus. A fundamental
goal is to determine the relative contribution of all involved
structures in the acquisition, storage and representation of
experience, not which structure holds the entire memory.
Moreover, learning studies employing pure tones have
universally found the development of plasticity in A1,
beginning with the work of Galambos et al. [7] (see also
Background section). One can argue that the results of all
pure tone studies are epiphenomenal, but it would be more
fruitful to seek the principles that govern the learning-based
induction of A1 plasticity for all acoustic stimuli, including
pure tones. We believe that although this task is difficult,
success will ultimately depend upon a detailed character-
ization of the plasticity under consideration.
Summary
Forms of plasticity (points 1–4)
O&S have cast doubt on our findings of CS-specific
increased responses and CS-directed tuning shifts on the
grounds of (a) failure to control context, (b) selection of
CS-specific increases, while ignoring CS-specific
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decreases, and (c) using a measure that was biased to reveal
increases at the expense of decreases. All of these critiques
have been examined and found to reflect unsupported
assumptions, failure to distinguish between training trials
and post-training receptive fields, failure to distinguish
between primary auditory cortex and fields A2 and VE, and
misreading of our Methods sections. Moreover, our findings
have been replicated for different reinforcers (appetitive,
aversive, brain reward), tasks (classical and instrumental
conditioning), and taxa (guinea pig, rat, bat) (reviewed in [35]).
In addition, O&S claim that CS-specific decreased
responses develop when context is controlled, but in fact,
they actually changed state between training and post-
training testing, failed to provide behavioral validation of
learning and present results that could be explained by
extinction if their subjects had learned.
Functions of plasticity (points 5, 6)
O&S hold that CS-specific plasticity in A1 cannot represent
part of the substrate of auditory associative memory
because this function is incompatible with task-specific
plasticity. However, the evidence for a mnemonic function
for CS-specific increases, CS-directed tuning shifts, and
enlargement of CS-band representation in A1 is consistent
and strong. Moreover, task-specificity does not appear to be
incompatible with memorial functions.
O&S falsely attribute to us the claim that A1 is essential
for all auditory memory. They further minimize studies
using pure tones because lesions of A1 do not prevent
learning about pure tones. However, their conclusions are
too sweeping as one cannot draw conclusions about all
auditory memory from examples of particular auditory
tasks. Thus, A1 is important in pure tone tasks depending
on the methods of training and the “questions” posed; e.g.,
A1 lesions impair both discrimination learning and extinc-
tion. O&S seem to hold that memory traces can develop
only in structures in which lesions produce obvious
behavioral impairments. However, contemporary concep-
tions of memory are based on parallel processing and
distributed storage so that memories can be stored in the
auditory cortex even if a particular task demand exploits
only subcortical information storage.
What does it all mean?
The overwhelming finding for associative representational
plasticity is that learning biases the processing and
representation of stimuli to emphasize sounds that gain
increased behavioral importance. CS-specific increases in
responses and CS-directed tuning shifts have been observed
across laboratories, species, types of conditioning, and
motivation (reviewed in Weinberger [35]). As the attributes
of this type of plasticity are the same as the attributes of
behavioral associative memory, CS-specific increases satisfy
the criteria for constituting specific memory traces. However,
additional research is needed to determine if such plasticity
truly indexes aspects of memory. Moreover, the manner in
which such memory storage would guide planning and
behavior constitutes a major problem that will require the
concerted efforts of many laboratories.
The only evidence for CS-specific decreases and lateral
contrast enhancement as animals learn about the signal
importance of a tone has been provided by O&S. However,
their claim cannot be sustained due to the lack of behavioral
validation of learning and the state and/or extinction
confounds that are endemic to the experimental design
which they used. Of course, it is possible that more
compelling studies of associative learning will reveal CS-
specific decreases, in which case, it will become necessary
to determine the superordinate principles that govern the
sign of CS-specific plasticity in A1. It is more likely that
processes such as lateral contrast enhancement are engaged
in perceptual learning [6]. However, the situation may be
very complex because solid experiments have reported
either a specific increase in A1 area of discriminative
frequency bands in the monkey [43] or no plasticity despite
good perceptual frequency learning in the cat [44].
Beyond particular studies that have been conducted to
date, this debate highlights critical procedural and concep-
tual issues that need to be considered for future research.
Chief among these is that neural data obtained during
training trials do not reflect only associative processes, but
rather a mixture of performance (e.g., state) and associative
factors. Moreover, while the specificity of plasticity can be
obtained using the unified experimental design, it is
essential that pre-training and post-training RFs and other
representations of neural processing be obtained while
subjects are in the same state.
This debate has underscored the need for careful and
comprehensive conceptualization of relationships between
measures of brain function and measures of behavior.
Learning is always inferred from behavior, never directly
observed. Neural plasticity can be directly observed.
Therefore, in asking questions about learning, it is essential
to consider which questions to ask and which behavioral
measures would most sensitively reveal the answers. This
needs to involve determination of what subjects have
learned and even how they have learned it. For example,
subjects can use different learning strategies to arrive at the
same overall level of correct performance.
Finally, the practice of explicitly stating assumptions
should be encouraged. This is particularly important in
behavioral neuroscience in which researchers have diverse
backgrounds. In the cases of the two disciplines of the
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neurobiology of learning and memory and brain mecha-
nisms of sensory/perceptual processes, the need seems
especially important. These two fields are both concerned
with the processing and “fate” of environmental stimuli, i.e.,
experience. Research on primary auditory cortex, and other
sensory cortices, increasingly reveals their entwinement, as
Nature does not respect such disciplinary boundaries.
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